Does Internet Gambling Self-Exclusion Work?

Tobias Hayer and Gerhard Meyer were the source for a previous post on the effectiveness of casino self-exclusion. In 2011, they published an article that looked at self-exclusion from an Austrian internet gambling site (12-page pdf here). Internet gambling, in its currently fragmented state, would seem to be not all that fertile a ground for self-exclusion programs, at least those that apply to but a single e-gaming operator. Instead of having to drive to a different casino (and one owned by a different company), self-excluded e-gamblers would only have to establish an account at a different website. Further, there is some evidence that internet gamblers are more likely than bricks-and-mortar casino players to be problem gamblers. On the other hand, as internet gambling self-exclusion involves no face-to-face meetings, people concerned with their internet gambling behavior might be less shy than terrestrial gamblers about seeking out self-exclusion. (There are various routes to broader self-exclusion from internet gambling, too.)

Hayer and Meyer find that self-exclusion from a single internet casino tends to work, in the sense that gambling frequency, amounts, and problems decline following self-exclusion. The number of self-excluded gamblers who participated in the follow-up surveys is fairly small, so the results should not be relied upon too heavily. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with what we know about land-based exclusions, as well as our rudimentary pre-existing knowledge of web-gambling exclusion: internet self-exclusion seems to lead to reduced gambling problems.

Effectiveness of Self-Exclusion in British Columbia

The report (71-page pdf here) noted in the previous post utilized focus groups consisting of providers of self-exclusion, as well as telephone interviews of self-excluded clients. About one-third of the participants completely abstained from gambling during their exclusion (which lasted, at their discretion, either six months, or one, two, or three years). The methodology does not provide, it seems, a clean comparison between the extent of gambling problems pre- and post-exclusion, but the data that are provided suggest that those who continued to gamble, by and large, gambled less frequently, and still found that the self-exclusion program was helpful. (After the exclusion period was over, very few clients remained abstinent from gambling; again, however, the extent of their gambling seemed to be lower than before the exclusion.) The clients were asked if they were satisfied with the self-exclusion program, and more than 80% reported satisfaction; an even higher percentage indicated that they would recommend the program to others.

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)

European casinos generally require that patrons provide identification upon entering, and this measure aids enforcement of exclusion orders. (The news is filled with a continuing series of reports of excluded gamblers in other jurisdictions managing to evade, at least for a time, their exclusion orders.) A new article by Tobias Hayer and Gerhard Meyer uses a series of questionnaires to learn about the effectiveness of casino self-exclusion programs in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The results comport well with the findings from prior studies undertaken at other locales: gamblers who choose to self-exclude typically experience significant declines in gambling-related problems, and they tend to view the self-exclusion quite positively. These general findings are complemented by a slew of interesting details, including the importance of other gamblers, family members, and friends in informing people about the existence of self-exclusion programs. Only a relatively small number of gamblers learn of self-exclusion through information displays inside the casinos, suggesting that there is room for improved publicity measures. Casino staff, in these European locations, are nearly twice as likely as passive information displays to be a source of knowledge of the self-exclusion option.

The ID controls in European casinos, and the accompanying increase in the enforceability of an exclusion order, might make self-exclusion more popular as a preventative measure in Europe than elsewhere. About one-quarter of the participants in the study would not be classified as problem or pathological gamblers, by the usual metrics, at the time they chose to exclude.

Hayer and Meyer also indicate that my longstanding belief that formal casino self-exclusion programs originated in Canada in 1989 is terribly misguided. They report that self-exclusion programs existed decades earlier in both Germany and Austria. I will have to do some revising!


Previous (misguided?) posts in this series:

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)

Choosing to be Fined for Failure to Quit Smoking

Casino-style self-exclusion presents a physical barrier to further betting, and also lowers the reward to gambling, through the threat of confiscation of winnings (and embarrassment at being caught in violation of the exclusion order). Now-standard(?) commitment contracts implement the reward diminution element, but not the physical unavailability, when it comes to refraining from the undesired behavior.

A recent article by Gine', Karlan, and Zinman (working paper version here) examined a field trial in the Philippines of commitment contracts aimed at smoking cessation. Smokers were offered a chance to conveniently make weekly deposits to an illiquid bank account. (The idea was that they would deposit about the amount they would otherwise spend on cigarettes.) After six months, the depositors who took up this option would be tested to see if they had quit smoking. If they had quit, they would have access to their funds; if not, they would lose the money. The vast majority of smokers who were offered the savings account option refused to take part. Most of those who did take up the commitment contract failed to quit smoking. Nevertheless, quit rates were higher for those offered the savings account option than for those in the control group, and the difference persisted six months later.

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)

The year 2010 marked the first publication assessing the long-term outcomes for self-excluded casino gamblers. Nelson et al. interviewed 113 people who had self-excluded from Missouri's casinos four-to-ten years earlier. (Missouri's self-exclusion program involves a lifetime ban.) Once again, self-exclusion looks to be a very effective tool for helping problem gamblers control their wagering -- though most continued to gamble in some form (including lotteries) and at some non-Missouri or non-casino locales. Only 18 of the 113 disassociated people attempted to gamble in Missouri casinos after the ban, and nine of those managed to get away with it on one or more occasions. Two-thirds of participants were quite satisfied with the self-exclusion program. Most had not gambled at all in the six months prior to the interview, and of those who had gambled, their gambling problems tended to be significantly alleviated compared with their pre-exclusion situation. Even the haphazardly enforced Missouri self-exclusion program appears to offer significant benefits to most people who choose to take advantage of it.

Previous posts in this series:

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)

And one subsequent post:

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)

The title of the post is somewhat misleading in this instance: Video Gambling Machines (VDMs) in New Zealand exist in lots of places besides casinos. For that reason, self-exclusion from casinos alone would not be a very effective method for fighting gambling problems among those who patronize VDMs. New Zealand legislation provides that any gambling venue that permits a disassociated person to gamble could face significant penalties.

Peter Townsend (2007) presents the results of a study of a small sample (32 at the follow-up stage) of individuals who had self-excluded, as part of more comprehensive therapy for their gambling problems. The vast majority (26 of 32) report complete abstinence from gambling, and for those who continue to gamble, their gambling problems fall markedly, on average. Once again, self-exclusion (here, in combination with other measures) seems to be a pretty effective tool against compulsive gambling.

Other posts in this series:

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)

The study looked at in the prior post about the effectiveness of casino self-exclusion involved asking self-excluders at a certain point in time about their gambling experiences. A later article by Ladouceur, Sylvain, and Gosselin (2007) follows self-excluders (or "disassociated" persons) over the course of two years. The initial contact took place at the time the gambler chose to self-exclude, followed by four follow-ups at six-month intervals. The self-exclusion order itself lasted either six months, one year, or two years, at the discretion of the gambler -- one year was the most popular exclusion period. As you would suspect, the disassociated people tended to have severe gambling problems, as well as a belief that they could not control their own wagering. One of the sad markers of pathological gamblers applied to this group, alas: more than one-third had thoughts of suicide, and 6.5% had attempted suicide, during the previous six months. Of the 161 disassociated people who started to take part in the study, only 53 participated in all four of the follow-up rounds of interviews.

Once again, the self-exclusion program appears to have been quite successful, given the extent of gambling pathology exhibited by most of the self-excluders. The urge to gamble fell markedly from the time of the initial exclusion order to the six-month follow-up, and remained at a significantly lower level two years after disassociating. Further, gambling problems likewise declined -- even though many of the disassociated returned to casino gambling. As Ladouceur, Sylvain, and Gosselin put it (p. 92), "major improvements were recorded on the urge to gamble, perceived control over gambling, and the intensity of of the negative consequences of gambling on daily activities, social life, work and mood." Further, these results were achieved in Quebec, where no penalties (beyond removal from the casino) would be imposed upon a disassociated person who was identified trying to enter a casino or after successfully sneaking in and engaging in gambling. In other locales, such breaches could lead to fines or arrests for trespassing.


Other posts in this series:

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
 
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)

I guess it would be helpful to know, once you start a blog about self-exclusion, if self-exclusion is effective at reducing the gambling problems of "disassociated people." (Employing the phrase "disassociated people" for those who self-exclude from gambling comes from the state of Missouri's self-exclusion program.) I want to lay out some of the evidence that speaks to this issue, but it will take a long time to do it justice; hence, this post is numbered (I), as further, related posts are anticipated.

OK, effective relative to what? It is a commonplace in addiction therapy of all types that relapse is quite frequent: for drug addiction treatment, something like fifty percent of patients relapse, often multiple times. By these standards, self-exclusion looks like a pretty effective treatment for pathological gambling. Of course, relapse rates depend on details of the program, including enforcement: how easy is it to sneak back in to a casino from which you have self-excluded and gamble? In many jurisdictions, especially those that do not demand an ID from all entrants, it looks to be fairly easy.

One early study that speaks to effectiveness is by Ladouceur et al. (2000). The authors survey some 220 self-excluders. They find that these people overwhelmingly tend to meet the criteria for being pathological gamblers. Nonetheless, according to self-reports, 30% of these self-excluders managed complete abstinence from gambling during their stint as disassociated people. Further, self-exclusion is quite popular with those who have tried it: a large majority report a favorable impression of their self-exclusion program. Support remained impressive, but not so universal, among those who had self-excluded more than once. This particular report doesn't say much about the effectiveness of those who self-excluded but did not remain totally abstinent -- but even they can greatly reduce their gambling-related problems with the help of self-exclusion. As with other forms of addiction treatment, some people self-exclude from gambling without harboring any intention to embark on abstinence. These people hope to use self-exclusion as a way to help them control their gambling, not eliminate it.


Other posts in this series:

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)

Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)

Making Self-Exclusion Work Better

While Vice Squad is a big proponent of the principle of vice self-exclusion programs, the practice in US casinos leaves much to be desired. It seems to be relatively easy, for instance, for some self-excluded gamblers to return to a casino without much hindrance. A check of IDs for all gamblers, or a more universal use of smart cards that hook into gambling machines, might help to make self-exclusion programs more reliable.

One of the standard features of a self-exclusion program is that someone who has volunteered to join the excluded ranks is removed from the list of those who are sent promotional material. This is another area of slippage between theory and practice, apparently. The Illinois Gaming Board is fining a casino $800,000 for not sealing off the self-excluded from marketing appeals. The same casino received a $600,000 fine for similar activities two years ago. I would think that these significant fines will concentrate casino minds on providing a more effective barrier between their promotions and self-excluded gamblers.