Casino-style self-exclusion presents a physical barrier to further betting, and also lowers the reward to gambling, through the threat of confiscation of winnings (and embarrassment at being caught in violation of the exclusion order). Now-standard(?) commitment contracts implement the reward diminution element, but not the physical unavailability, when it comes to refraining from the undesired behavior.
A recent article by Gine', Karlan, and Zinman (working paper version here) examined a field trial in the Philippines of commitment contracts aimed at smoking cessation. Smokers were offered a chance to conveniently make weekly deposits to an illiquid bank account. (The idea was that they would deposit about the amount they would otherwise spend on cigarettes.) After six months, the depositors who took up this option would be tested to see if they had quit smoking. If they had quit, they would have access to their funds; if not, they would lose the money. The vast majority of smokers who were offered the savings account option refused to take part. Most of those who did take up the commitment contract failed to quit smoking. Nevertheless, quit rates were higher for those offered the savings account option than for those in the control group, and the difference persisted six months later.
Showing posts with label reward diminution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reward diminution. Show all posts
Sunday, January 16, 2011
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Lottery Self-Exclusion
Casino self-exclusion schemes generally combine physical unavailability with reward diminution: the casino tries to keep you away, and if you do gamble, they try to prevent you from collecting winnings. Lottery self-exclusion, however, seems to involve only reward diminution. Lottery outlets will sell disassociated persons all the tickets that they want, but the state lottery authorities will not allow the self-excluded to collect large wins. In both Illinois and Iowa, for instance, "large wins" are those involving $600 or more.
If all of the monetary and hedonic reward from gambling could be removed, then making gambling physically unavailable would offer little improvement in combatting problem gambling. Alternatively, if physical unavailability were perfect, reward diminution would be superfluous. But in practice, both barriers to availability and diminished rewards are imperfect and subject to evasion -- and both make a contribution towards controlling problem gambling.
Placing a bet as a commitment to undertaking a personal reform -- a' la stickK.com -- involves a form of reward diminution: fail to reform and you have to pay a self-imposed fine. Public pronouncements of an intention to reform establish another version of reward diminution: failure to reform will cost you some respect in the eyes of your peers, along with some self-respect, perhaps. But many people trying to reform a bad habit try to institute both physical unavailability and reward diminution. For instance, they adopt a rule not to keep any ice cream in the house, and then feel guilty (and possibly lose self-respect as well as the respect of others) when they violate their rule and consume the now-available ice cream.
If all of the monetary and hedonic reward from gambling could be removed, then making gambling physically unavailable would offer little improvement in combatting problem gambling. Alternatively, if physical unavailability were perfect, reward diminution would be superfluous. But in practice, both barriers to availability and diminished rewards are imperfect and subject to evasion -- and both make a contribution towards controlling problem gambling.
Placing a bet as a commitment to undertaking a personal reform -- a' la stickK.com -- involves a form of reward diminution: fail to reform and you have to pay a self-imposed fine. Public pronouncements of an intention to reform establish another version of reward diminution: failure to reform will cost you some respect in the eyes of your peers, along with some self-respect, perhaps. But many people trying to reform a bad habit try to institute both physical unavailability and reward diminution. For instance, they adopt a rule not to keep any ice cream in the house, and then feel guilty (and possibly lose self-respect as well as the respect of others) when they violate their rule and consume the now-available ice cream.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Winnings Confiscated From Excluded Gambler
An enforced order for self-exclusion from a casino can be very effective at bolstering the willpower to refrain from gambling. The effectiveness comes from two features of self-exclusion, physical inaccessibility and reward diminution. Physical inaccessibility arises because the casino tries to keep you out, and in many jurisdictions can charge you with trespassing if you show up on their property. Reward diminution arises, in part, because the casino can confiscate any large jackpots that you might win, if you successfully sneak back in.
The legal basis for casinos to take away an excluded gambler's winnings, however, is not completely settled. (The casinos generally can't keep the confiscated winnings; rather, they are donated to a charity, perhaps one involved with fighting pathological gambling.) In Iowa, the state Supreme Court recently overturned a lower court ruling, deciding that a casino was within its rights to refuse to hand over winnings of over $9,000 to an excluded gambler. This particular gambler, however, was not self-excluded: he had been permanently barred from the casino following a conviction for criminal mischief arising from an incident where he attacked a slot machine.
The casino in question was in the news again last week, with exclusion again featuring as part of the story. The allegation is that a man made a bomb threat against the casino after he was refused admission because he did not show a picture ID. A requirement that casino patrons present IDs, incidentally, is very helpful in enforcing exclusion bans. Another helpful feature is US federal tax law, that requires withholding and form-filling before slot machine winnings of $1,200 or more can be paid. It was the necessity to fill out the tax paperwork that led to the excluded gambler's identification in the incident that the Iowa Supreme Court recently ruled upon.
The legal basis for casinos to take away an excluded gambler's winnings, however, is not completely settled. (The casinos generally can't keep the confiscated winnings; rather, they are donated to a charity, perhaps one involved with fighting pathological gambling.) In Iowa, the state Supreme Court recently overturned a lower court ruling, deciding that a casino was within its rights to refuse to hand over winnings of over $9,000 to an excluded gambler. This particular gambler, however, was not self-excluded: he had been permanently barred from the casino following a conviction for criminal mischief arising from an incident where he attacked a slot machine.
The casino in question was in the news again last week, with exclusion again featuring as part of the story. The allegation is that a man made a bomb threat against the casino after he was refused admission because he did not show a picture ID. A requirement that casino patrons present IDs, incidentally, is very helpful in enforcing exclusion bans. Another helpful feature is US federal tax law, that requires withholding and form-filling before slot machine winnings of $1,200 or more can be paid. It was the necessity to fill out the tax paperwork that led to the excluded gambler's identification in the incident that the Iowa Supreme Court recently ruled upon.
Labels:
casino,
identification,
Iowa,
reward diminution,
tax
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