The gambling form of self-exclusion is a negative commitment, a pledge to avoid wagering. Other commitments are positive, resolutions to accomplish something. Of course, these terms are somewhat arbitrary, given that a (negative) commitment to avoid wagering is simultaneously a positive commitment to engage only in non-wagering behavior. But only somewhat arbitrary -- the activities that violate a negative commitment seem to be a much more proscribed set than those that constitute a violation of a positive commitment. All else equal (which is never the case), are positive commitments harder to adhere to than negative ones?
Last week, during spring break, the library at the University of Chicago hosted an institution aimed at providing a positive commitment for graduate students to make progress on their dissertations. (I can't find any web-based info on this so I am relying on my faulty memory.) The students could sign up to take part in a write-in, in which they were more or less locked in the library for four (I think) hours per day. The students, stickK-like, put up $50 that would be forfeited if they did not put in their time. I understand that for some students, at least, the write-in was a success.
A positive commitment to write a thesis is simultaneously a negative commitment not to procrastinate in writing your thesis. (Incidentally, I meant to post this days ago.) But there are so many ways to procrastinate, while the ways to break a negative commitment to avoiding gambling are only those behaviors that involve gambling.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Sunday, March 21, 2010
No Class-Action For Canadian Self-Excluders
The interest of casinos in enforcing the ban on self-excluded individuals might be limited: the self-excluded tend to be among the best casino customers. In Ontario, an attempted class-action lawsuit on behalf of more than 10,000 self-excluded gamblers, claiming that insufficient effort was brought to bear in keeping them out of gambling establishments, has been rejected. The judge's ruling does not prevent individual gamblers from bringing lawsuits based on a lack of enforcement of their self-exclusion orders. The class is not certified, however, on the grounds that the gamblers' experiences are sufficiently diverse that they cannot all be considered to be in the same legal boat.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Tracking Internet Gambling
Sweden's state-owned internet gambling operator Svenska Spel makes available a responsible gambling tool named Playscan. Players who are part of Svenska Spel's loyalty program have the option of downloading Playscan at no charge. Playscan tracks the time and money that players spend gambling and continuously informs players of their situation. The software allows players to partially or fully self-exclude: partially, by setting time or money limits, and fully, by precommitting to not gambling with Svenska Spel for a period of time chosen by the gambler among four options: a day, a week, a month, and permanently. Playscan employs a forecasting system that predicts a player's future gambling. A traffic-light system displays Playscan's view of someone's gambling: green means gambling is controlled, yellow means signs of problem gambling are developing, and red means that problem gambling behaviors are detected. (The light system is based on changes from past behavior.) Those gamblers who are red-lighted automatically are removed from marketing initiatives. A 2009 article by Griffiths, Wood, and Parke indicates that many gamblers find Playscan to be useful, and a significant percentage have made use of the self-exclusion options.
As internet gambling sites more-or-less automatically track a player's behavior, even for those players who are not part of a loyalty program, the inclusion of responsible gambling tools, including self-exclusion, into the gambling environment, can be implemented with relative ease.
As internet gambling sites more-or-less automatically track a player's behavior, even for those players who are not part of a loyalty program, the inclusion of responsible gambling tools, including self-exclusion, into the gambling environment, can be implemented with relative ease.
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Singapore Casino Exclusions Update
Two weeks ago we noted that the opening of the first resort casino in Singapore had sparked a spate of self-exclusions as well as a few family exclusions, where family members intervene to have someone barred from the casino. The extent of exclusions continues to grow, to 426 self-excluders (previously 264) and to 37 family exclusions (from 31). But these numbers are dwarfed by what Singapore calls third-party exclusions. These arise automatically: gamblers who are undischarged bankrupts, and those receiving public assistance, are not allowed into the current and future Singapore casinos. So far, 28,690 people have received an automatic exclusion.
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)
The title of the post is somewhat misleading in this instance: Video Gambling Machines (VDMs) in New Zealand exist in lots of places besides casinos. For that reason, self-exclusion from casinos alone would not be a very effective method for fighting gambling problems among those who patronize VDMs. New Zealand legislation provides that any gambling venue that permits a disassociated person to gamble could face significant penalties.
Peter Townsend (2007) presents the results of a study of a small sample (32 at the follow-up stage) of individuals who had self-excluded, as part of more comprehensive therapy for their gambling problems. The vast majority (26 of 32) report complete abstinence from gambling, and for those who continue to gamble, their gambling problems fall markedly, on average. Once again, self-exclusion (here, in combination with other measures) seems to be a pretty effective tool against compulsive gambling.
Other posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)
Peter Townsend (2007) presents the results of a study of a small sample (32 at the follow-up stage) of individuals who had self-excluded, as part of more comprehensive therapy for their gambling problems. The vast majority (26 of 32) report complete abstinence from gambling, and for those who continue to gamble, their gambling problems fall markedly, on average. Once again, self-exclusion (here, in combination with other measures) seems to be a pretty effective tool against compulsive gambling.
Other posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Lottery Self-Exclusion
Casino self-exclusion schemes generally combine physical unavailability with reward diminution: the casino tries to keep you away, and if you do gamble, they try to prevent you from collecting winnings. Lottery self-exclusion, however, seems to involve only reward diminution. Lottery outlets will sell disassociated persons all the tickets that they want, but the state lottery authorities will not allow the self-excluded to collect large wins. In both Illinois and Iowa, for instance, "large wins" are those involving $600 or more.
If all of the monetary and hedonic reward from gambling could be removed, then making gambling physically unavailable would offer little improvement in combatting problem gambling. Alternatively, if physical unavailability were perfect, reward diminution would be superfluous. But in practice, both barriers to availability and diminished rewards are imperfect and subject to evasion -- and both make a contribution towards controlling problem gambling.
Placing a bet as a commitment to undertaking a personal reform -- a' la stickK.com -- involves a form of reward diminution: fail to reform and you have to pay a self-imposed fine. Public pronouncements of an intention to reform establish another version of reward diminution: failure to reform will cost you some respect in the eyes of your peers, along with some self-respect, perhaps. But many people trying to reform a bad habit try to institute both physical unavailability and reward diminution. For instance, they adopt a rule not to keep any ice cream in the house, and then feel guilty (and possibly lose self-respect as well as the respect of others) when they violate their rule and consume the now-available ice cream.
If all of the monetary and hedonic reward from gambling could be removed, then making gambling physically unavailable would offer little improvement in combatting problem gambling. Alternatively, if physical unavailability were perfect, reward diminution would be superfluous. But in practice, both barriers to availability and diminished rewards are imperfect and subject to evasion -- and both make a contribution towards controlling problem gambling.
Placing a bet as a commitment to undertaking a personal reform -- a' la stickK.com -- involves a form of reward diminution: fail to reform and you have to pay a self-imposed fine. Public pronouncements of an intention to reform establish another version of reward diminution: failure to reform will cost you some respect in the eyes of your peers, along with some self-respect, perhaps. But many people trying to reform a bad habit try to institute both physical unavailability and reward diminution. For instance, they adopt a rule not to keep any ice cream in the house, and then feel guilty (and possibly lose self-respect as well as the respect of others) when they violate their rule and consume the now-available ice cream.
Friday, March 5, 2010
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)
The study looked at in the prior post about the effectiveness of casino self-exclusion involved asking self-excluders at a certain point in time about their gambling experiences. A later article by Ladouceur, Sylvain, and Gosselin (2007) follows self-excluders (or "disassociated" persons) over the course of two years. The initial contact took place at the time the gambler chose to self-exclude, followed by four follow-ups at six-month intervals. The self-exclusion order itself lasted either six months, one year, or two years, at the discretion of the gambler -- one year was the most popular exclusion period. As you would suspect, the disassociated people tended to have severe gambling problems, as well as a belief that they could not control their own wagering. One of the sad markers of pathological gamblers applied to this group, alas: more than one-third had thoughts of suicide, and 6.5% had attempted suicide, during the previous six months. Of the 161 disassociated people who started to take part in the study, only 53 participated in all four of the follow-up rounds of interviews.
Once again, the self-exclusion program appears to have been quite successful, given the extent of gambling pathology exhibited by most of the self-excluders. The urge to gamble fell markedly from the time of the initial exclusion order to the six-month follow-up, and remained at a significantly lower level two years after disassociating. Further, gambling problems likewise declined -- even though many of the disassociated returned to casino gambling. As Ladouceur, Sylvain, and Gosselin put it (p. 92), "major improvements were recorded on the urge to gamble, perceived control over gambling, and the intensity of of the negative consequences of gambling on daily activities, social life, work and mood." Further, these results were achieved in Quebec, where no penalties (beyond removal from the casino) would be imposed upon a disassociated person who was identified trying to enter a casino or after successfully sneaking in and engaging in gambling. In other locales, such breaches could lead to fines or arrests for trespassing.
Other posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)
Once again, the self-exclusion program appears to have been quite successful, given the extent of gambling pathology exhibited by most of the self-excluders. The urge to gamble fell markedly from the time of the initial exclusion order to the six-month follow-up, and remained at a significantly lower level two years after disassociating. Further, gambling problems likewise declined -- even though many of the disassociated returned to casino gambling. As Ladouceur, Sylvain, and Gosselin put it (p. 92), "major improvements were recorded on the urge to gamble, perceived control over gambling, and the intensity of of the negative consequences of gambling on daily activities, social life, work and mood." Further, these results were achieved in Quebec, where no penalties (beyond removal from the casino) would be imposed upon a disassociated person who was identified trying to enter a casino or after successfully sneaking in and engaging in gambling. In other locales, such breaches could lead to fines or arrests for trespassing.
Other posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)
I guess it would be helpful to know, once you start a blog about self-exclusion, if self-exclusion is effective at reducing the gambling problems of "disassociated people." (Employing the phrase "disassociated people" for those who self-exclude from gambling comes from the state of Missouri's self-exclusion program.) I want to lay out some of the evidence that speaks to this issue, but it will take a long time to do it justice; hence, this post is numbered (I), as further, related posts are anticipated.
OK, effective relative to what? It is a commonplace in addiction therapy of all types that relapse is quite frequent: for drug addiction treatment, something like fifty percent of patients relapse, often multiple times. By these standards, self-exclusion looks like a pretty effective treatment for pathological gambling. Of course, relapse rates depend on details of the program, including enforcement: how easy is it to sneak back in to a casino from which you have self-excluded and gamble? In many jurisdictions, especially those that do not demand an ID from all entrants, it looks to be fairly easy.
One early study that speaks to effectiveness is by Ladouceur et al. (2000). The authors survey some 220 self-excluders. They find that these people overwhelmingly tend to meet the criteria for being pathological gamblers. Nonetheless, according to self-reports, 30% of these self-excluders managed complete abstinence from gambling during their stint as disassociated people. Further, self-exclusion is quite popular with those who have tried it: a large majority report a favorable impression of their self-exclusion program. Support remained impressive, but not so universal, among those who had self-excluded more than once. This particular report doesn't say much about the effectiveness of those who self-excluded but did not remain totally abstinent -- but even they can greatly reduce their gambling-related problems with the help of self-exclusion. As with other forms of addiction treatment, some people self-exclude from gambling without harboring any intention to embark on abstinence. These people hope to use self-exclusion as a way to help them control their gambling, not eliminate it.
Other posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)
OK, effective relative to what? It is a commonplace in addiction therapy of all types that relapse is quite frequent: for drug addiction treatment, something like fifty percent of patients relapse, often multiple times. By these standards, self-exclusion looks like a pretty effective treatment for pathological gambling. Of course, relapse rates depend on details of the program, including enforcement: how easy is it to sneak back in to a casino from which you have self-excluded and gamble? In many jurisdictions, especially those that do not demand an ID from all entrants, it looks to be fairly easy.
One early study that speaks to effectiveness is by Ladouceur et al. (2000). The authors survey some 220 self-excluders. They find that these people overwhelmingly tend to meet the criteria for being pathological gamblers. Nonetheless, according to self-reports, 30% of these self-excluders managed complete abstinence from gambling during their stint as disassociated people. Further, self-exclusion is quite popular with those who have tried it: a large majority report a favorable impression of their self-exclusion program. Support remained impressive, but not so universal, among those who had self-excluded more than once. This particular report doesn't say much about the effectiveness of those who self-excluded but did not remain totally abstinent -- but even they can greatly reduce their gambling-related problems with the help of self-exclusion. As with other forms of addiction treatment, some people self-exclude from gambling without harboring any intention to embark on abstinence. These people hope to use self-exclusion as a way to help them control their gambling, not eliminate it.
Other posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (V)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)
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Canada,
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Effectiveness,
Quebec,
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