European casinos generally require that patrons provide identification upon entering, and this measure aids enforcement of exclusion orders. (The news is filled with a continuing series of reports of excluded gamblers in other jurisdictions managing to evade, at least for a time, their exclusion orders.) A new article by Tobias Hayer and Gerhard Meyer uses a series of questionnaires to learn about the effectiveness of casino self-exclusion programs in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The results comport well with the findings from prior studies undertaken at other locales: gamblers who choose to self-exclude typically experience significant declines in gambling-related problems, and they tend to view the self-exclusion quite positively. These general findings are complemented by a slew of interesting details, including the importance of other gamblers, family members, and friends in informing people about the existence of self-exclusion programs. Only a relatively small number of gamblers learn of self-exclusion through information displays inside the casinos, suggesting that there is room for improved publicity measures. Casino staff, in these European locations, are nearly twice as likely as passive information displays to be a source of knowledge of the self-exclusion option.
The ID controls in European casinos, and the accompanying increase in the enforceability of an exclusion order, might make self-exclusion more popular as a preventative measure in Europe than elsewhere. About one-quarter of the participants in the study would not be classified as problem or pathological gamblers, by the usual metrics, at the time they chose to exclude.
Hayer and Meyer also indicate that my longstanding belief that formal casino self-exclusion programs originated in Canada in 1989 is terribly misguided. They report that self-exclusion programs existed decades earlier in both Germany and Austria. I will have to do some revising!
Previous (misguided?) posts in this series:
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (IV)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (III)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (II)
Does Casino Self-Exclusion Work? (I)
Friday, January 21, 2011
Monday, January 17, 2011
eCOGRA's Safe and Fair Seal Requires Exclusion Options
Internet gambling seems to combine two area of human activity that display more than their share of less-than-trustworthy behavior. Someone interested in placing a bet online could be scared off over the uncertainty surrounding the integrity of the transaction offered by an internet betting shop or casino.
The internet gambling industry recognized their credibility problem at an early stage. One response that they adopted is a form of self-regulation. This response involves a sort of Good Housekeeping seal of approval, and one non-profit, independent (of the online betting shops) organization that awards the e-gambling seals is eCOGRA. To qualify for the right to display a "Safe and Fair" seal, internet gambling providers must meet a host of requirements concerning player protection, fair gaming, and responsible conduct. The detailed guidelines can be found here (49-page pdf). More than 100 e-casinos, internet poker rooms, and e-betting shops, including many of the best-known ones, currently are authorized to display the Safe and Fair seal.
Among the requirements for a Safe and Fair seal is the provision and effective communication of self-exclusion measures. A 24-hour cooling-off option must be available to players, and a six-month or longer exclusion also must be on offer. Third parties can request that a gambler be excluded -- as in Singapore's land-based casinos -- but those requests need not be honored. The guidelines also require, if I understand things correctly, that the gambling sites allow players to establish deposit limits, and to decrease those limits. Requests to increase a deposit limit that previously had been decreased cannot be honored for at least 24 hours. So both self-exclusion and self-limiting features are built into Safe and Fair e-gambling sites. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be the case that a single exclusion request will apply to multiple websites. (A system mentioned earlier had the feature of allowing a single exclusion to be implemented at multiple sites.) An e-gambler hoping to cut off access to his or her vice of choice might have a hard time maintaining enough stamina to self-exclude from dozens of e-casinos, of course.
The internet gambling industry recognized their credibility problem at an early stage. One response that they adopted is a form of self-regulation. This response involves a sort of Good Housekeeping seal of approval, and one non-profit, independent (of the online betting shops) organization that awards the e-gambling seals is eCOGRA. To qualify for the right to display a "Safe and Fair" seal, internet gambling providers must meet a host of requirements concerning player protection, fair gaming, and responsible conduct. The detailed guidelines can be found here (49-page pdf). More than 100 e-casinos, internet poker rooms, and e-betting shops, including many of the best-known ones, currently are authorized to display the Safe and Fair seal.
Among the requirements for a Safe and Fair seal is the provision and effective communication of self-exclusion measures. A 24-hour cooling-off option must be available to players, and a six-month or longer exclusion also must be on offer. Third parties can request that a gambler be excluded -- as in Singapore's land-based casinos -- but those requests need not be honored. The guidelines also require, if I understand things correctly, that the gambling sites allow players to establish deposit limits, and to decrease those limits. Requests to increase a deposit limit that previously had been decreased cannot be honored for at least 24 hours. So both self-exclusion and self-limiting features are built into Safe and Fair e-gambling sites. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be the case that a single exclusion request will apply to multiple websites. (A system mentioned earlier had the feature of allowing a single exclusion to be implemented at multiple sites.) An e-gambler hoping to cut off access to his or her vice of choice might have a hard time maintaining enough stamina to self-exclude from dozens of e-casinos, of course.
Sunday, January 16, 2011
Choosing to be Fined for Failure to Quit Smoking
Casino-style self-exclusion presents a physical barrier to further betting, and also lowers the reward to gambling, through the threat of confiscation of winnings (and embarrassment at being caught in violation of the exclusion order). Now-standard(?) commitment contracts implement the reward diminution element, but not the physical unavailability, when it comes to refraining from the undesired behavior.
A recent article by Gine', Karlan, and Zinman (working paper version here) examined a field trial in the Philippines of commitment contracts aimed at smoking cessation. Smokers were offered a chance to conveniently make weekly deposits to an illiquid bank account. (The idea was that they would deposit about the amount they would otherwise spend on cigarettes.) After six months, the depositors who took up this option would be tested to see if they had quit smoking. If they had quit, they would have access to their funds; if not, they would lose the money. The vast majority of smokers who were offered the savings account option refused to take part. Most of those who did take up the commitment contract failed to quit smoking. Nevertheless, quit rates were higher for those offered the savings account option than for those in the control group, and the difference persisted six months later.
A recent article by Gine', Karlan, and Zinman (working paper version here) examined a field trial in the Philippines of commitment contracts aimed at smoking cessation. Smokers were offered a chance to conveniently make weekly deposits to an illiquid bank account. (The idea was that they would deposit about the amount they would otherwise spend on cigarettes.) After six months, the depositors who took up this option would be tested to see if they had quit smoking. If they had quit, they would have access to their funds; if not, they would lose the money. The vast majority of smokers who were offered the savings account option refused to take part. Most of those who did take up the commitment contract failed to quit smoking. Nevertheless, quit rates were higher for those offered the savings account option than for those in the control group, and the difference persisted six months later.
Evaluating Improved Self-Exclusion
The heart of self-exclusion programs is the negative commitment, the ban on gambling at the excluded locales. But someone who volunteers for self-exclusion also is in a position to be informed about treatment options, and access to those options can be eased. (Currently, only a small percentage of problem gamblers, and of self-excluders, receive any formal treatment.) A Montreal casino introduced a reinforced self-exclusion program in 2005, one that included an initial evaluation, monthly phone contacts, and a mandatory meeting before the revocation of the exclusion agreement. The new variant was evaluated by Tremblay, Boutin, and Ladouceur in 2008. Given the option of either a standard self-exclusion program or the "improved" version, a majority of excluders chose the improved version. Their gambling problems decreased significantly, and generally they were quite favorably disposed towards the improved self-exclusion regime.
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Gambling Losses, Non-Monetary
We noted recently how problem gamblers not only spend a lot of money gambling, they spend a lot of time gambling. Self-limiting schemes might involve setting time restrictions, as well as money restrictions. Further, time loss might be a spur to self-exclude, as was suggested by this report concerning a Scottish casino located near some institutions of higher learning:
“We have had quite a lot of students self-excluding and it is not always due to the amount of money they are spending, but sometimes the amount of time when it starts interfering with their studies.”Gambleaware, a British charitable organisation aimed at responsible gambling, offers a time management diary for people looking to control their betting.
Will Problem Gamblers Self-Limit?
Self-exclusion and self-limit programs are aimed at people who have, or fear they might have, self-control problems with wagering. Most of the people who choose to self-exclude do seem to be problem or pathological gamblers. But if you offer a voluntary self-limiting program -- say, the option of making a commitment prior to entering a casino to spend no more than $x there (where the gambler can choose x) -- will people who have gambling problems choose to participate? A recent study by Lia Nower and Alex Blaszczynski suggests that problem gamblers might not be all that eager to take part.
The study looks at 127 adults who, on their way into an Australian casino, agreed to fill out questionnaires. Based on the ensuing self-reports, 20 of these people were categorized as problem gamblers. When asked about whether they would take advantage of "smart card" technology that would allow them to limit their monetary exposure once inside the casino, the problem gamblers were less likely than everyone else to endorse the use of such cards. Further, the problem gamblers who were willing to use the cards were more likely to want the cards to be flexible, so that additional funds could be accessed during a single session or additional cards purchased. This relative reluctance to limit gambling losses is indicated despite the fact that problem gamblers also were the most likely to lose track of their monetary situation (money won or lost) during a gambling session.
Many gamblers who self-exclude do so only after wagering has wreaked havoc upon their lives. Does a lack of sophistication by problem gamblers about their own future self-control issues suggest the desirability of a mandatory regime of limit setting, such as that maintained at Svenska Spel's internet poker facility?
The study looks at 127 adults who, on their way into an Australian casino, agreed to fill out questionnaires. Based on the ensuing self-reports, 20 of these people were categorized as problem gamblers. When asked about whether they would take advantage of "smart card" technology that would allow them to limit their monetary exposure once inside the casino, the problem gamblers were less likely than everyone else to endorse the use of such cards. Further, the problem gamblers who were willing to use the cards were more likely to want the cards to be flexible, so that additional funds could be accessed during a single session or additional cards purchased. This relative reluctance to limit gambling losses is indicated despite the fact that problem gamblers also were the most likely to lose track of their monetary situation (money won or lost) during a gambling session.
Many gamblers who self-exclude do so only after wagering has wreaked havoc upon their lives. Does a lack of sophistication by problem gamblers about their own future self-control issues suggest the desirability of a mandatory regime of limit setting, such as that maintained at Svenska Spel's internet poker facility?
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Self-Limits in Internet Gambling
Responsible internet casinos follow the lead of their terrestrial counterparts by offering a self-exclusion option -- and many of the programs are tied together, so that one application results in exclusion from myriad gambling sites. Furthermore, options for partial exclusions also can be made available -- as with Sweden's Svenska Spel.
In 2008, addiction researchers published an article that looked at the behavior of internet gamblers who took advantage of a self-limiting option. (The article grew out of an ongoing research collaboration between web gaming company bwin and the Division on Addictions associated with Harvard Medical School.) Daily (1000 euros) and monthly (5000 euros) deposit limits are imposed by bwin, but internet gamblers are allowed to choose lower limits. (The 1000 and 5000 euro limits were those in place at the time of the study.) At least for the sample used in the article, the vast majority of gamblers on bwin chose not to establish their own limits. Those who did self-limit, however, tended to decrease the frequency of their betting and the amount wagered. More than 10 percent of self-limiters abstained completely (from gambling with bwin) after imposing the limits; more than 7 percent imposed limits before they placed their first bet.
The authors point out that the time devoted to gambling can be as big a problem for some people as monetary losses. Self-limiting programs could invoke time constraints, on a per session, per-day, per-month (and so on) basis. (Come to think of it, something that limited my time on the internet to two hours per day might make my life better...)
In 2008, addiction researchers published an article that looked at the behavior of internet gamblers who took advantage of a self-limiting option. (The article grew out of an ongoing research collaboration between web gaming company bwin and the Division on Addictions associated with Harvard Medical School.) Daily (1000 euros) and monthly (5000 euros) deposit limits are imposed by bwin, but internet gamblers are allowed to choose lower limits. (The 1000 and 5000 euro limits were those in place at the time of the study.) At least for the sample used in the article, the vast majority of gamblers on bwin chose not to establish their own limits. Those who did self-limit, however, tended to decrease the frequency of their betting and the amount wagered. More than 10 percent of self-limiters abstained completely (from gambling with bwin) after imposing the limits; more than 7 percent imposed limits before they placed their first bet.
The authors point out that the time devoted to gambling can be as big a problem for some people as monetary losses. Self-limiting programs could invoke time constraints, on a per session, per-day, per-month (and so on) basis. (Come to think of it, something that limited my time on the internet to two hours per day might make my life better...)
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